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Abstract—IoT devices for low power applications often rely 
on energy harvesting techniques. In these implementations, 
IoT nodes must be aware of the amount of available energy. 
When the energy is about to run out, they need to halt and save 
the context of the CPU, which is restored as soon as the energy 
is available again. Some of the existing techniques rely on the 
transfer of the scan chains content to a Non-Volatile Memory 
(NVM). However, the saved state of the device might be the 
target of malicious attacks, including tampering and theft of 
confidential data. One solution is to provide the encryption and 
the integrity of context data. In this paper, we propose the 
implementation of an additional module interposed between 
the CPU and the NVM, which provides both these security 
features. 
Keywords—IoT, Hardware Security, Context Saving, PUF 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet of Things (IoT) has known an extraordinary 
fast dissemination in the last years. Nowadays, we see more 
and more often the commercialization of IoT devices dealing 
with numerous every-day-life applications. Very often, these 
devices integrate security functions because they manage 
encrypted communications over the network, or because they 
deal with confidential and private data [1]. 
Energy consumption is a very tight design constraint in 
IoT-oriented designs. Consequently, techniques have been 
developed that allow IoT nodes to be independent from 
power supply sources, both wired and battery-based. Energy 
harvesting makes devices self-powered resorting to 
environmental sources. In this scenario, the availability of 
the power source is not always guaranteed. For this reason, 
these devices need to be designed in order to be robust 
against intermittent power supply. 
Some techniques have been developed in the last years to 
deal with this problem. In most solutions the objective is to 
save the state of the computation on a Non-Volatile Memory 
(NVM) at specific times. This way, whenever the power 
supply cannot be granted, the running process is halted and 
its state is saved into the NVM. This is resumed as soon as 
the energy is available again by moving back the content of 
the NVM into the CPU. This mechanism is called context 
saving. 
A recently proposed technique for context saving relies 
on the presence of scan chains inside the CPU [2]. Scan 
chains are always present inside microprocessor designs for 
testing purposes. For the purpose of context saving, the focus 
is on a properly designed scan chain that traverses all the 
registers that must be saved. When the computation is halted 
due to a lack of energy, all the content of the scan chain is 
transferred to a dedicated NVM. 
In [3], a security issue related to context saving was 
introduced. The need for security in many emerging IoT 
applications is in contrast to existing context saving 
techniques that expose the content of the internal registers of 
the CPU to an external NVM without implementing security 
criteria. In fact, NVMs can be observed and even tampered 
with by any attacker that has physical access to the device 
[4]. Since the IoT infrastructures are usually very wide, 
having physical access to even only a single device is not an 
unlikely assumption in most applications. This access can be 
a way to perform attacks that affect the whole infrastructure. 
In such cases, the interruption of the power supply can be 
maliciously triggered by the attacker in order to force the 
CPU to expose its content timely during computation. 
Reading and modifying the content of many kinds of NVMs 
can be successfully performed according to the implemented 
technology and the kind of NVM used. Content read-out can 
lead to steal secret keys or, more generally, to have 
knowledge of contents that are usually stored into secure 
memories when the system is regularly turned off. 
In this paper, we propose the Secure Context Saving Unit 
(SCSU), which can be plugged into any SoC design and 
activated whenever the user wants the system to perform a 
secure context saving in the case of supply unavailability. 
Confidentiality is provided via stream cipher based 
encryption, while the integrity against memory tampering is 
provided via a Message Authentication Code (MAC) derived 
from the saved context. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II, we provide a background on existing context 
saving techniques and the related security issues. In Section 
III, we present the implementation of our solution. Section 
IV presents experimental results. Finally, we draw some 
conclusions in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Context Saving Techniques 
Context saving techniques are divided into two 
categories, depending on whether the state of the processor 
core is saved in-place (InP) or moved out-of-place (OoP). 
InP techniques are based on state retentive flip-flops, which 
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are able to store their state even when the power supply is 
turned off [5][6]. In OoP techniques, which are the scope of 
this paper, the content of the CPU is moved towards an 
external retaining memory. OoP methods are generally 
preferred over InP because they require less design efforts 
and they consume less dynamic power [2]. Generally, using 
off-chip memories (e.g. flash memories) is too expensive 
from an energetic point of view. For this reason, in-chip 
memories are the preferred solution for OoP context saving 
techniques. 
OoP context saving techniques that have been proposed 
in the literature handle the problem at different levels of the 
digital stack. The power supply can be periodically 
monitored by specific software procedures that are generated 
in the compilation phase [7]. Alternatively, an interrupt 
mechanism can be employed, in order to trigger the context 
saving as soon as the supply voltage goes under a predefined 
threshold [2][8]. The technique presented in [8] relies on 
interrupt routines that transfer the context to the NVM. On 
the other side, the technique presented in [2] relies on a 
context saving procedure that is entirely managed at 
hardware level (i.e. the scan chain content is transferred to 
the NVM). 
Another critical aspect for the comparison of these 
techniques is the kind of NVM that is used as target of the 
saved context. In [7], the context is saved into an external 
flash memory. Alternatively, the authors of [8] and [2] 
proposed the implementation of a Ferromagnetic RAM 
(FRAM) inside the chip, in order to host the saved context. 
FRAM memories have high efficiency and low power 
consumption during the write process. For this reason, the 
context saving procedure is far more energy efficient, 
making FRAM and similar technologies preferred for 
context saving. 
B. Security issue 
The use of NVMs based on emerging technologies, such 
as FRAMs, poses a strong vulnerability with respect to 
physical attacks. Some recent works have addressed possible 
security issues of such emerging NVMs. For instance, the 
authors of [9] and [10] have studied the effect of active 
attacks on the Oxide-based Resistive Random Access 
Memory (OxRRAM). These works showed that OxRRAM 
cells could be easily attacked by laser injections. More 
specifically, it is quite easy to change even a single bit of 
such memories from ‘1’ to ‘0’. The physical phenomenon 
that allows such an attack (i.e., the localized increase of the 
temperature) can also be exploited in other types of 
memories, such as Phase Change Memories. Another work 
[11] showed how Spin Transfer Torque Magnetic Memories 
(STT-RAM) could be affected by external magnetic fields, 
thus allowing the control of the memory elements. In 
general, it has been demonstrated that physical attacks are 
possible for emerging NVM technologies, and they might be 
even easier to perform than fault attacks targeting traditional 
memories (e.g. flip-flops, SRAMs, DRAMs, flash 
memories). Traditional memory technologies, such as flash 
memories, generally provide integrated security features. It is 
not the same for emerging memory technologies. For this 
reason, we believe that the employment of this new kind of 
memories for applications such as context saving deserves 
the attention of security researchers. 
In order to tamper with the device, the attacker can either 
observe the internal behavior of the device or can actively 
modify its state. When context saving techniques are 
implemented, this boils down to a physical attack on the 
NVM. Several techniques and means exist to inject a fault 
into the device in order to alter the content of the memory 
elements [12]. This modification could lead to an error that 
can be exploited to retrieve a secret key (e.g., differential 
fault injection as in [13]), to the modification of the device 
state with a possible privilege escalation or to the bypass of 
security checks. For instance, faults can be injected to 
change the flow of an executed software code. For code 
implementing cryptographic algorithms, changes in the 
program flow can be a security threat.  
To summarize, recent works have shown that NVMs that 
are used in the next generation of IoT devices might clearly 
lack of security in at least two aspects: (i) their content can 
be read, and (ii) their content can be tampered with. Because 
of these vulnerabilities, it is important to protect the data 
stored into the NVM against physical attacks, in order not to 
allow privilege escalation or lack of confidentiality. 
III. SECURE CONTEXT SAVING UNIT 
The solution proposed in this paper adds security features 
to the context saving technique proposed in [2]. The memory 
elements of the CPU are traversed by two different scan 
chains: (i) one involving the volatile domain (i.e. the CPU 
content that can be lost when the power supply is off); (ii) 
the other involving the non-volatile domain (i.e. the set of 
memory elements that must be preserved when the energy 
supply is not available). The transfer of the non-volatile 
domain content to the NVM and vice versa through the scan 
chain is managed by a Context Saving Controller. It 
performs the Context Storing Procedure (CSP) when the 
device is about to be turned off, and the Context Loading 
Procedure (CLP) when the computation is restored. A 
supervisor manages a higher level control. It receives an 
interruption from the energy supply when this is going below 
a specific threshold. After that, the supervisor sends an 
interruption to the CPU that runs a software routine in order 
to enter into a predefined sleep mode. At this point, the CSP 
procedure is performed at hardware level and the scan chain 
content is transferred to the target NVM. When the system 
wakes up from the sleep mode, the supervisor checks if an 
image to restore is present in the NVM. In the affirmative 
case, the CLP is started by the controller and the CPU state is 
restored. The Secure Context Saving Unit (SCSU) is serially 
connected between the scan chain and the target NVM. In 
order to cope with the security threats described in the 
previous section, the SCSU provides both confidentiality and 
integrity of context data that are going to be stored into the 
target NVM. Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of 
the SCSU module. 
In order to provide confidentiality, data are encrypted 
before being stored into the NVM and then decrypted when 
loaded back into the CPU. If the encryption method is 
secure, the attacker is not able to understand the content of 
the NVM and to extract any information out of it. The SCSU 
performs the encryption resorting to a stream cipher. The 
stream cipher performs a simple XOR operation between an 
input bitstream and a random sequence of bits, called 
keystream. The keystream is generated pseudo-randomly 
from a seed k and is denoted as 𝑆(𝑘). The encryption 
function is 𝐸(𝑚, 𝑘) = 𝑚 ⊕ 𝑆(𝑘), while the decryption 
function is 𝐷(𝑐, 𝑘) = 𝑐 ⊕ 𝑆(𝑘). If the generated keystream 
is unpredictable, the stream cipher will be considered secure. 
The encryption does not prevent the attacker from 
modifying the content of the NVM. This can generate a 
vulnerability even if the attacker does not understand the 
data content. For this reason, the SCSU also performs 
integrity verification resorting to a MAC module. The MAC 
takes as input the plaintext context data and a secret key. It 
produces a signature at the output, which is stored into the 
NVM, together with the encrypted context data. When the 
context is loaded back to the CPU, the decrypted data are 
sent to the MAC module in order to compute the signature 
again and compare it with the one stored into the NVM. If 
they are equal, the content of the NVM is intact, thus the 
computation can start again. On the contrary, if some 
tampering occurred, the supervisor must reset the content of 
the scan chain and the computation must start from scratch 
and/or a security alarm should be raised. 
Both the stream cipher and the MAC module need a 
secret key in order to securely perform their operations. 
Moreover, these keys, which are produced in the CSP phase, 
must be recovered in the CLP phase. However, there are two 
important aspects to take into account: 1) using the same key 
to perform the encryption of data more than once is not a 
secure choice when dealing with a stream cipher; 2) used 
keys must be saved after the CSP phase in order to be used in 
the CLP phase. This cannot be done simply by saving the 
keys into the NVM, because we assume that the attacker is 
able to access the NVM and read its content. 
The key generation is performed by a True Random 
Number Generator (TRNG) and a Physical Unclonable 
Function (PUF). In particular, the TRNG generates a 
random value, representing a challenge for the PUF. The 
keys for the stream cipher and the MAC module are 
extracted by the response of the PUF to the challenge. The 
challenge is also stored into the NVM. The saved challenge 
is used during the CLP to recover the key via the PUF. If an 
attacker reads the content of the NVM, he/she will know the 
challenge, but context data cannot be decrypted nor the 
signature tampered with. The only way to obtain the keys is 
to know the behavior of the PUF. However, a PUF relies on 
unique physical characteristics of each device sample, 
making its response unpredictable. The TRNG is employed 
in order to generate a different challenge for each context 
saving session and avoid key repetition. 
The controller is in charge of executing the CLP and the 
CSP procedures. The CSP is managed by the Store signal 
and the CLP is managed by the Load signal. During the 
CSP, the controller also selects the multiplexer driving the 
Data_in port of the NVM. The context saving controller 
implements a Finite State Machine (FSM), described in Fig. 
2. The FSM is divided into two main flows, one 
implementing the CSP, the other implementing the CLP. By 
default, the controller is in IDLE state. The controller 
receives an input from the supervisor determining the 
procedure to start, the CSP or the CLP. Then, the FSM 
executes each step of the procedure, depending on the value 
of the counter cnt. The counter is reset after each step. At 
the end of the executed procedure, the controller goes back 
to the IDLE state and waits for new instructions from the 
supervisor. In the next subsections, we detail the different 
steps of the two procedures. 
 
Fig. 1 Architecture of the SCSU 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 FSM of the context saving controller 
 
 
 
A. Context Saving Procedure 
As soon as the supervisor sends the request to save the 
context, the system enters in the CSP phase. The CSP 
consists in four steps, described in Fig. 3: 1) the generation 
of the keys for the stream cipher and the MAC; 2) the setup 
of the stream cipher and the MAC; 3) the scan chain content 
storing; 4) the signature storing. 
The TRNG starts its initialization as soon as the CSP 
begins. Firstly, the FSM enters the KEY_GEN state, where 
a random number is generated. The TRNG requires an 
initial setup time, 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑁𝐺_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 , to reach sufficient entropy in 
order to generate random numbers properly. Once the 
TRNG is initialized, the controller sets the Store_steps 
signal controlling the multiplexer at the NVM input in order 
to select the TRNG output. The multiplexer at the PUF 
input is also connected to the TRNG output via the Store 
signal. The random number generated by the TRNG serves 
as a challenge for the PUF. This challenge is saved into the 
NVM in order to be used for restoring the context data in 
the CLP. At the same time as the challenge is saved, the 
PUF generates the response.  
This response is used as key for the stream cipher and 
the MAC. The stream cipher and MAC setups are 
performed in parallel in the SAVE_SETUP state. Once both 
modules are initialized, the context data can be saved into 
the NVM. 
The FSM enters the DATA_SAVE state. The controller 
selects the datapath connecting the scan chain to the 
multiplexer at the NVM input. The context data contained in 
the scan chain are shifted out. During data shifting, the 
encryption is performed by the stream cipher, and the result 
is saved into the NVM. At the same time, the same data are 
processed in parallel by the MAC module.  
Once the content of the whole scan chain is shifted out, 
the FSM enters the MAC_SAVE state. The controller 
connects the MAC output to the NVM input through the 
Store_steps signal. The signature computed by the MAC is 
saved into the NVM. At this point, the CSP is finished and 
the controller goes back to the IDLE state. 
B. Context Loading Procedure 
The CLP is also carried out in four steps, described in 
Fig. 4: 1) the recovering of the keys used during the CSP by 
reading out the saved challenge; 2) the initialization of the 
stream cipher and the MAC module; 3) the loading of the 
decrypted context; 4) the verification of the integrity. 
When the CLP begins, the FSM enters the 
READ_CHAL state. The controller selects the multiplexer 
driving the input of the PUF through the Load signal, in 
order to retrieve the challenge from the memory. The 
challenge saved into the NVM is then fetched and sent to 
the PUF. The PUF response corresponds to the keys used by 
the stream cipher and the MAC during the CSP.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Context Saving Procedure 
 
 
 
Once the keys are generated, the stream cipher and the 
MAC module are initialized in the LOAD_SETUP state. 
When both setups have finished, the FSM goes into the 
DATA_LOAD state. The encrypted context data are read 
out and decrypted by the stream cipher, generating the same 
keystream used in the CSP. At the same time, the decrypted 
data are processed by the MAC module, while the scan 
chain of the CPU is loaded in parallel. However, the context 
of the CPU is not resumed until the end of the MAC_COMP 
state. 
In the MAC_COMP state, the saved signature is fetched 
from the NVM and compared with the one produced by the 
MAC module. The result of the integrity control is sent to 
the supervisor through the Verify signal. After that, the CLP 
is finished and the FSM goes back to the IDLE state, 
waiting for another request from the supervisor.  
IV. RESULTS 
In this Section, we provide an implementation of the 
SCSU, in order to evaluate its cost and performance. The 
evaluation of the proposed solution has been carried out 
measuring the area footprint, the impact on the context 
saving time and the energy consumption. 
We have chosen to implement a TRNG from the 
Synopsys DesignWare IP library [14] and an Arbiter PUF 
for the key generation, the Trivium stream cipher for the 
encryption/decryption of the context data and the HMAC 
algorithm (based on the SHA-256 hash function) for the 
signature computation. Table I reports the area cost for each 
module composing the proposed solution. Globally, the area 
cost is equal to 28295 gate equivalent. The additional 
hardware is a serious overhead, since the application is 
intrinsically extremely low power. However in the IoT 
domain, it is very common that an attack on a node of the 
network can compromise the entire infrastructure and lead 
to serious problems. Therefore, this area overhead is the cost 
to pay in order to ensure a higher security for the whole 
infrastructure. 
The proposed solution also brings an overhead on the 
performances. Indeed, the CSP and CLP executions are 
modified in order to ensure confidentiality and integrity. 
Consequently, they require more time to execute. The 
execution of the CSP is composed by the initialization of the 
TRNG, the PUF computation, the setup of the stream cipher 
TABLE I.  AREA COST OF SECCS MODULE 
Submodule Area (gate equivalent) 
TRNG 15000 
PUF 516 
HMAC 10763 
Stream cipher 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Context Loading Procedure 
 
 
 
and the MAC module (both processed in parallel), the 
shifting out of the whole scan chain of the CPU, and the 
saving of the signature. The saving of the challenge and the 
encrypted data are not considered in the execution time of 
the procedure, since this is performed in parallel to the PUF 
computation. The storing of the encrypted data is performed 
when the content of the scan chain is shifted out.  
Concerning the CLP, its execution is composed of the 
reading of the challenge from the NVM, the PUF 
computation, the parallel setup of the stream cipher and the 
MAC, the filling of the scan chain with the decrypted 
context data, and the reading of the signature from the 
NVM. The reading out of the encrypted data is not 
considered in the execution time, since the data are read 
while the scan chain is filled.  
More formally, 𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑃 and 𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑃 respectively denote the 
time to execute both procedures, 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑁𝐺_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 the time to 
initialize the TRNG, 𝑇𝑃𝑈𝐹  the time to obtain the response 
from the PUF, 𝑇𝑆𝐶  the time for the stream cipher setup, 
𝑇𝑀𝐴𝐶  the time for the HMAC module setup, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 and 𝑇𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑒  
the time to access the NVM for reading and writing 
respectively and 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛) the length of the 
scan chain. 𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑃  is defined as: 
𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑃 = 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑁𝐺_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑈𝐹 + max(𝑇𝑆𝐶 , 𝑇𝑀𝐴𝐶)
+ length(𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛) + 𝑇𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑒        (1) 
𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑃 is defined as: 
𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑃 = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝑇𝑃𝑈𝐹 + max(𝑇𝑆𝐶 , 𝑇𝑀𝐴𝐶 )
+ length(𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛) + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑       (2) 
Concerning power consumption, previous works have 
proven that hardware techniques for context saving 
represent a smaller overhead with respect to software 
procedures. In [2], the energy consumption to transfer 
context data from the scan chains of the CPU to the target 
NVM has been measured being 41pJ/b on a 65nm standard 
library. The security module proposed in this paper 
produces an additional energy consumption of 3.64pJ/b for 
the stream cipher encryption and 16pJ/b for the MAC 
signature generation on a similar technology library. This 
represents an overhead of 48% on the energy required to 
store the context into the NVM. This is an acceptable 
overhead when dealing with the security of the whole IoT 
infrastructure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a solution for processor-based IoT 
devices requiring security. We consider a system 
performing context saving to external NVMs, activated 
when the available energy is not sufficient to continue the 
execution of the operations. At the same time, we want to 
prevent attacks on the saved state of the device, including 
tampering and fault attacks. For this reason, we proposed a 
Secure Context Saving Unit that provides a hardware 
module easy to implement inside a System on Chip (SoC). 
This module provides both confidentiality and integrity to 
all the CPU content that is saved into the target NVM. We 
have shown that the proposed solution can have a large 
impact on the area overhead of the system. However, the 
need for security cannot be ignored in many applications. 
For this reason, we believe that scarifying a part of the 
power budget can be necessary for higher security.  
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